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CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
15 U. S. C. § 1692 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Since the early days of commerce, society has realized that goods
and services could be obtained on one day and paid for on another.
However, many instances began to occur in which the lender could
not collect money owed him. The lender was eventually forced to let
someone else collect the money for him. As a result, society provided
a caste of individuals known as debt collectors.'
Although the term "credit" has been a part of business vernacular
for centuries,2 "consumer credit" is still in its infancy. 3 The reason is
that easily accessible sales credit to the public is only possible in an
economic environment marked by excess discretionary income.4
Thus, with the rapid growth of the new middle class, the advent of
sales credit, and the rise of discretionary income in the United States,
a new class of purchasers of goods and services has emerged, i.e., con-
sumers.'
As with the advent of any social change, the growing accessibility
of consumer credit has created novel problems. The rise in consumer
credit outstanding has greatly contributed to the growth of third
party debt collectors in America and the substantial business derived
'See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Title VIII, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1978), which states in pertinent part:
The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which
is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.
In subscriptions (A) through (G) several classes of persons who do engage in the collec-
tion of debts are excluded from the statutory definition. Therefore, the common law
definition has been reduced for statutory enforcement purposes.
"'Credit is derived from the Latin term creditum which means "'something en-
trusted or loaned." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
311 (1971).
'See Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Curran].
'See Curran, id. at 413.
'See Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
643 (1968).
'According to the Federal Reserve Board, total credit outstanding in 1950 was 21.5
billion dollars, where ten years later in 1960 installment credit outstanding alone
reached 43.0 billion dollars. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 534
(1977). The pattern of growth has continued to increase at incredible rates. In 1968 the
installment credit outstanding at 82.9 billion dollars nearly doubled the 1960 figures.
See 54 FED. RESERVE BULL. A52 (Nov. 1968). By October of 1977 the figure had more
than doubled again. Outstanding installment credit had reached 209.1 billion dollars.
See 63 FED. RESERVE BULL. A42 (Dec. 1977).
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therefrom. The Senate Reports on Hearings of proposed debt collec-
tion legislation reported that
[tihere are more than 5,000 collection agencies across the country,
each averaging eight employees. Last year, more than $5 billion in
debts were turned over to collection agencies. One trade association
which represents approximately half of the Nation's independent col-
lectors states that in 1976 its members contacted eight million con-
sumers.
7
Along with the increase of availability of consumer credit, there has
also been a rise in bankruptcies' and defaulting debtors.'
In times of default on note payments, the ultimate remedies avail-
able to creditors are assignment of wages,'" garnishment of wages,"
IS. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [ 1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1695, 1696 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT.]
'In California for instance, the number of bankruptcy petitions rose from 4,124 to
19,404 between the years 1950 to 1960. In 1964 the number of petitions rose to
29,651. Thus, in the five year period between 1960 to 1964, petitions increased over
fifty percent, and over six hundred percent in the fifteen year period between 1950 to
1964. See 1950 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS TABLE F-2; 1960 Id. at F-2; 1964 Id. at F-2. But see 1976 Id.
at F-2; 1977 Id. at F-2. In 1976 the number of bankruptcy petitions in California had
risen to only 39,877 and in 1977 to only 31,596. In the nation as a whole there has even
been a marked decrease in the number of petitions for bankruptcy. In 1976 there were
246,549 petitions in the country as a whole, 34,950 in the Fifth Circuit, and 2,894 in
Mississippi. In 1977, however, there were only 214,399 petitions in the country as a
whole, 32,039 in the Fifth Circuit, and 2,590 in Mississippi. Thus the recent decline in
the rate of petitions for bankruptcy may be attributed to the explosion of consumer
credit legislation which has been occurring since the late 1960's.
OSee D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as D.
Caplovitzl. Reasons most frequently given for consumer default are 1) Debtor's
mishaps and shortcomings, 2) The debtor's belief that the wrong merchandise has been
delivered, 3) The debtor's dissatisfaction with the quality of the merchandise, 4) The
debtor's actual irresponsibility or dishonesty in trying to escape from his obligations,
and 5) The debtor's belief that he has been deceived by the seller. Id. at 53-190. See
also Comment, Installment Sales: Plight of the Low-income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J. LAW &
SOC. PROB. 1,4 (1966).
"°See generally Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations about Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 562 (1967):
A wage assignment is a voluntary act by a debtor assigning to a creditor all or a
portion of his future wages for payment of an obligation. Normally, the
employer does not make payments directly to the creditor until he is notified
that the debtor, his employee, has defaulted. Thus the wage assignment
"secures" the debt-it is not the source of primary payment.
Id.
11 d.
A wage garnishment is a judicial proceeding which enables a creditor to reach
the debtor's wages after default, usually to enforce a judgment.
The fundamental difference between the two procedures is that wage assign-
ment, a voluntary contractual assignment, is initiated with the agreement,
while garnishment is instituted by operation of law.
Id. at 562-63.
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replevin or self-help.' 2 The problem with such creditor remedies is a
matter of substance.
The laws regulating consumer credit in most states today are largely
borrowed from commercial law, which regulates relationships be-
tween buyers and sellers in the business world. The law of contract in
commercial transactions is based on the assumption that the parties
not only enter the transaction in good faith, but that they fully under-
stand all the rights and duties embodied in the contract's various
clauses.
This model breaks down when the parties to the contract are a busi-
ness firm and a consumer. The consumer, unlike the business firm,
rarely enters into contractual relationships and has little understand-
ing of the document to which he affixes his signature."3
It is also held by some that the substantive inadequacies in state laws
result from a failure on the part of most state legislatures "to
recognize and treat the consumer-credit problem as a total process
(emphasis added) represented by the consumer-credit market."' This
may be especially true in those states which have not adopted legisla-
tion similar to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF PAST STATE REMEDIES
At the Senate Subcommittee hearings on Consumer Affairs for
proposed debt collection legislation, the committee found "[tihe
primary reason why debt collection abuse is so widespread is the lack
of meaningful legislation on the state level."'" The Senate hearings
revealed that thirteen states, including Mississippi, have no debt col-
lection laws; that another eleven states have collection laws, but they
"provide little or no effective protection.""' Eighty million
"Prior to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), there was no requirement that
debtor be entitled to a judicial hearing prior to an action in replevin. Under Fuentes,
however, the Supreme Court declared that a replevin of goods prior to a judicial deter-
mination is a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 81-86.
"3D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 9, at 2-3.
"Curran, supra note 3, at 410.
"SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. See also Proposed Amendment to the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act: Hearings on S. 656, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,2 (1977). (statement of Sen. Riegle). [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings.] See also Jordan & Warren, A PROPOSED UNIFORM CODE FOR CON-
SUMER CREDIT, 8 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 441 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Jordan &
Warren].
"SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 2.
(statement of Sen. Riegle); 21-22 (statement of Rep. Annunzio). See also Curran supra
note 3, at 421:
When the licensing requirement is primarily a revenue-raising device, potential
licensees often need only file the appropriate forms and pay the required fee.
The fact that a creditor possesses such a license may mislead the public into
19791
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Americans, nearly 40 per cent of our population, have no meaningful
protection from debt collection abuse.""
The source of the debt collection problem stems from the original
contract the consumer entered into with the seller. When a buyer and
seller enter into a contract, the state generally stays out of the negotia-
tions and the parties are allowed to come to an agreement. 8 From
the very beginning, the consumer is placed at a disadvantage. Al-
though there has been much in the line of federal legislation requiring
the seller to fully disclose all of the details of the credit transaction,"
most consumers are totally incapable of making an educated decision
on such complicated matters.2 0 Once the consumer fails to pay, the
neutrality of the state ceases and the debtor is subject to the imminent
threat of wage garnishment,2 ' replevin, or self-help-all actions under
law with garnishment and replevin administered through the courts.
2 2
Therefore, the resulting problems confronting consumers, particular-
ly the indigent and poorly educated, can be linked to the state legis-
latures' failure to recognize the need to treat the consumer credit
market and consumer credit problems as one process.2 3
thinking that the state licensing agency considers the licensee to be competent,
honest, qualified by experience, or financially able to engage in licensed ac-
tivity. In fact, however, issuance of the license itself does not connote any prior
investigation by the licensing agency, and, consequently, it cannot be con-
sidered as the agency's endorsement of the licensee's character and fitness.
Id.
"7SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2; Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 2. But see
(19781 2-5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 4330. At the time of publication of this com-
ment, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia had adopted similar legislation.
"See Curran, supra note 3, at 428; Jordan & Warren, supra note 15, at 457. The
agreement is not exactly perfect, however. The inequities in bargaining positions usual-
ly result in an adhesion-standard form contract. The provisions will insulate the
creditor's remedies by stating the duties of the consumer to collect in case of a default in
payments.
"Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, (Truth-in-Lending Act), 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1665 (1970).20D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 9, at 3.
"Restrictions on Garnishment Act, Title 11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1970).
12See Jordan & Warren, supra note 15, at 457.
23See Curran, supra note 3, at 410. But cf. Tennessee Credit Clearing House v.
Lindsey, 162 Tenn. 149, 35 S.W. 2d 393 (1931). The case is an early example of the
function of the debt-adjusting agency. The agency's function is to help financially
troubled debtors to settle their financial obligations acting as an intermediary between
the debtor and his creditors. Since all that the creditor wants is the money owed him,
the adjusting agency is often able to obtain an extension from the creditor, and thus
modify the indebtedness of the consumer in such a way that the debt can be paid. See
also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(E), wherefore the concept of nonprofit debt-adjusting agen-
cies are upheld and exempted from the statutory definition of debt collector. But see
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 727. nn. 1 & 2 (1963) for legislative power to pro-
hibit adjusting agencies.
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Failure Under the Common Law to Protect
Consumers from Debt Collection Abuses
Under the common law, debt collectors have been allowed to
employ a wide range of tactics with little to fear in their attempts to
collect delinquent accounts: 1) skip tracing;2" 2) letters and tele-
grams; 2s 3) telephone calls; 26 4) contact with debtor's employer; 27
5) deceptive communications;29 6) sham legal process;29 and 7) sham
government forms.
30
In the collection process, debtors' rights to be free from harrass-
ment and abusive collection practices have historically been limited
to libel and slander.3 In recent years the common law remedies have
broadened to include invasion of privacy, abuse of process, malicious
prosecution, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 2 In
spite of the additional remedies, the consumer's ability to gain relief
"'Many times a debtor has moved his place of residence without leaving a forward-
ing address. For instance, if the collector is unable to locate the debtor in the telephone
book or city directory he may send letters to the address of a person whose name is
similar to that of the debtor's hoping that an unwary relative might know of his
whereabouts. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 802, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Cum.
Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 15 U.S.C. § 16921. Under the provisions of the statute
a collector seeking location information from any third person must identify himself
and his purpose of confirming location concerning the consumer, he cannot state that
the consumer owes a debt and when using the mails or telegram, he cannot use language
or symbols which communicate that the collector is in the debt collection business. Id.
at § 1692b. The debt collector is prohibited from communicating the consumer's debt
to any third person without the consumer's prior consent. Id. at § 1692c(b). It is an un-
fair collection practice for a collector to use any language or symbol when com-
municating with the debtor by mail or telegram if it indicates that he is in the collection
business. Id. at § 1692f(8).
251d
.2
'Id. at § 1692b,c.
"Id. at § 1692c(b).
' Id. at § 1692e. See also 1S U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
"'Id. at § 1692e(4)(5). This section basically prohibits collectors from theatening to
take legal actions when such actions are not legally possible or intended.
3"Id. at § 1692e(9)(10); See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 709-712; United States v. Boneparth,
456 F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1972) (1970); and § 97-9-I MISS. CODE ANN. (1972). 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(E), in which the concept of nonprofit debt-adjusting agencies are upheld and
exempted from the statutory definition of debt collector. But see Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 727, nn. I & 2 (1963) for legislative power to prohibit adjusting agencies.
"See 18 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Actionable Practices in Debt Collection § 24
(1967).
"See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 158 (1951):
The law. recognizes the right of a creditor to attempt, by all legitimate
means to collect whatever sums may be due to him from a debtor, and also to
threaten resort to proper legal procedure for the collection of such a debt.
However, when the creditor's agents become too enthusiastic in their pursuit of
the dollars due to the creditor, and resort to insulting and humiliating language,
whether verbally or by letter, the courts have, in many instances, held that the
creditor may be obliged to respond in damages for injuries caused to the debtor
thereby.
Id. at 158. See also note 32, supra.
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in court has remained very limited. The need for specific statutory
language, as exemplified by the federal Fair Debt Collection Act,3"
can be seen by the failure of the courts, via the common law, to pro-
tect consumers from unfair debt collection practices.
Libel and Slander
When prosecuting for libel or slander, it must be determined
(1) whether or not the defendant's publication"4 is true;" and
(2) whether the publication was made pursuant to a conditional-
qualified privilege. In the case of debt collecting ,agencies and credit
reporting agencies a conditional privilege normally exists.36 When
such a qualified condition exists, Mississippi courts have consistently
held that for a false publication in an action in libel or slander to
stand, the collector or collecting agency must have acted in such a
way as to show bad faith and malice. 7 The real difficulty lies in the
consumer-plaintiff's burden to prove bad faith and malice in the
creditor-defendant's 8 publication. Pursuant to Mississippi law,19 for
there to be malice the published statement must be false and
defamatory in order to injure the reputation of an individual and ex-
pose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.40
1115 U.S.C. § 1692.
""Publication is essential to slander, and it must be in the presence of one or more
other parties." Kirk Jewelers, Inc. v. Bynum, 222 Miss. 134, 139, 75 So. 2d 463, 464
(1954). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 776, 792 (4th ed. 1971).
3SW. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 824 (3d ed. 1964). Truth is a complete defense in civil
libel suits. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-57 (1972).
"'See Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Miss. 1971), affd, 438
F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1971). "Such a report enjoys a qualified privilege when it is made
in good faith as here .... It is the rule that where a statement or report is qualifiedly
privileged that it is immaterial whether its contents were libelous per se or libelous per
quod." Id. at 1045. See also Garraway v. Retail Credit Co., 244 Miss. 376, 141 So. 2d
727 (1962) & Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 240 Miss. 230, 126 So. 2d 271 (1961).
(Conditional privilege accorded collectors and mercantile reporting agencies); and
Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Graham, 181 Miss. 549, 179 So. 341 (1938) (conditional privilege
accorded former employer for statements made concerning termination of former
employee).
"See Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 355 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Miss.), affd, 438 F.2d
1043 (5th Cir. 1971).
The formulation and communication of confidential credit reports are an in-
tegral part of the business community and necessarily involve a certain amount
of intrusion or prying into one's personal affairs. It is only where actions of a
company engaged in this business are tainted with malice or a reckless
disregard for the truth that a cause of action [for an invasion] is established. Id.
at 467.
See also Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 430 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1970); Garraway v. Retail Credit Co., 244 Miss. 376, 141 So. 2d 727 (1962).
"See Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (1947). A "plaintiff to
recover for damages caused by defamation in these privileged reports must prove the
publication was made from express malice." Id. at 104. See also Garraway v. Retail
redit Co., 244 Miss. 376, 141 So. 2d 727 (1962); and Reliance Mfg. Co., v. Graham,
181 Miss. 549, 179 So. 341 (1938).
".MiSS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-1 (1972). See also Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Brooks, 69
Miss. 168, 13S 847 (1891).
"°See also GA. CODE § 105-701 (1968).
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The remedial scope of libel and slander actions is even more com-
plicated since the common law fails to provide a consistent legal
structure for consumer-debtors to rely on.4" It becomes apparent that
where a charge or imputation of credit and financial unworthiness
does not affect the debtor in his business, vocation, or profession, such
a publication is not libelous per se. Even if the debtor does receive
adverse feedback as a result of the publication, most collectors and
credit agencies are protected by the shield of conditional privilege, so
long as malice is not present in the publication.
Invasion of Privacy
This tort may be based on the over-zealous debt collector's at-
tempt to collect by giving undue publicity to the debt. "It is generally
recognized that a creditor has a right to take reasonable action to pur-
sue his debtor and persuade payment, although the steps taken may
result in some invasion of the debtor's privacy.''42 "The right of
privacy is designed primarily to protect the feelings ...of human
beings ... ""
The right of privacy is often infringed upon by creditors when a
privileged purpose is established. For instance, a collector's com-
munication with the debtor's employer to solicit the employer's aid in
collecting the amount due or to inform the employer that a garnish-
ment action will be brought has been upheld as privileged com-
munications.44 Calling the debtor and sending him telegrams have
been held to constitute a privileged invasion of the debtor's right to
privacy." Such communications have been held privileged because
the creditor or collector has a right to urge a payment of a just debt
and to threaten legal proceedings to enforce such payment." To
maintain an action for invasion of privacy when publication of the
plaintiff's indebtedness has been communicated to third parties, it is
"See Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Boltz, 123 Miss. 550, 86 So. 354 (1920).
As to language which imputes dishonesty or want of credit in an individual it is
very generally recognized that it is impossible to lay down any definite rule
which will govern in all cases, and that the language used and the particular
facts and circumstances of each case must control.
Id. at 558.
42Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750, 770 (1950).
'377 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 2 (1952).
"See Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789, (1948); and Lewis v.
Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
But see 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
"See Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225
(1950). Such communication with the debtor by the creditor or collector has been
upheld so long as the communication was made in good faith minus oppressive or coer-
cive conduct by the creditor. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(c),d(5).
"See Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177
P.2d 896 (1947).
1979]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
essential for the consumer-debtor to show that the collector has com-
municated to the public information concerning a private matter, and
show that the collector did so in a manner that was coercive and ag-
gressive. 7
Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish
A suit brought by a consumer-debtor will typically arise when a
collector, while in pursuit of collecting a just debt, becomes too en-
thusiastic in his pursuit and resorts to insulting and humiliating
language."8 In carrying the burden of proof, however, the plaintiff-
debtor's task is far from simple. The courts have consistently held
that the law provides no remedy for a plaintiff's mental distress when
the anxiety is a result of the collector's reasonable attempts to inform
the debtor that a valid debt needs to be paid4 9 and if the debt is not
paid the debtor will be subject to civil action.5"
Recovery has been limited to only those situations where the
defendant-collector's conduct has been shown to be extreme,5 with
"See Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948). See also Quina v.
Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); and Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 2d 35, 59 Ohio
Op. 2d 60, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). The conditional privilege of communication with
the debtor's employer in an attempt to collect a just debt may be forfeited if the collec-
tor attempts to create a situation where the employee may lose his job or make threats to
the employer of possible legal entanglements. Some oppressive or coercive conduct by
the creditor is essential to the tort.
"See T. G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So. 2d 481 (Miss. 1972).
There is a modem trend of court opinions moving toward permitting the
recovery for mental distress or emotional damages as an independent ground of
recovery, in cases of intentional or willfull wrong or acts done with such gross
carelessness or recklessness as to indicate utter disregard for the rights of others.
"See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1939).
5 E.g., in Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P.2d 330 (1943), the court
held that the defendant collector was merely threatening to do what he had a legal right
to do, and that "fright, worry, agitation, and the like, suffered from threats to take steps
for the collection of a debt or for the protection of legal rights based on statute, cannot
serve as the basis for damages." Id. at 332. See also Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 10
Ariz. App. 560, 460 P.2d 666 (1969); and Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 772 (1972):
[Tihe courts, while recognizing the potential liability for emotional distress or
consequential physical injury, have tended to place explicit limitations upon
recovery apparently in recognition of the fact that creditors have a right to seek
to collect debts at least by reasonable means, and of the possible danger of open-
ing the door to a flood of litigation for damages for hurt feelings and alleged
physical consequences flowing therefrom, which the average person may be ex-
pected to be compelled to withstand as a function of living in a modem society.
Id. at 778.
"See Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 304, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583 (1971):
The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's con-
duct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defen-
dant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the
[Vol. 1:157
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the express intent to cause physical injury,5 2 or where the distress
caused was of a severe nature.5 3 The aggrieved debtor must also be
prepared to demonstrate that his mental suffering is the natural and
probable result of the statements made by the defendant-collector.
s4
The courts have declared that "there is a vast difference in causal ef-
fect between a simple statement of purpose based on a clear legal
right, and aggravated, wanton, or abusive language in excess of
anything reasonably calculated to state a person's purpose based upon
a clear legal right." s
It is historically apparent that in a suit for mental anguish and
emotional distress, the debtor must first suffer severe emotional
and/or physical injury as a result of the collector's extreme and
malicious behavior before the debt collector is forced to cease his har-
assment tactics.5
Abuse of Process
and
Malicious Prosecution
The tort of abuse of process involves the misuse of legal process for
some purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ, i.e., coer-
cion, and outside the scope of legal authority"1 for which the process
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Id.
See also Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 111. 2d 85, 306 N.E.2d 765 (1977); Barnett v.
Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Agis v. Howard Johnson
Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976); T. C. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So. 2d
481 (Miss. 1972); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963);
Jones v. Nissenbaum, Rudolph & Seidner, 244 Pa. Super. 377, 368 A.2d 770 (1976); and
Moorhead v. J. C. Penny Co., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1977).
"See Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963). When
definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress
wrongfully caused by the defendant, the defendant may be liable for physical injuries.
See also Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1977). "Whether a
defendant's conduct in a common-law action is outrageous is determined by an objec-
tive standard unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility." Id. at
425.
"See note 52, supra.
"E.g., Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 183 Okla. 413, 82 P.2d 994, 995
(1938).
"Id. See also note 52, supra.
"See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a), d, e(4)(5), (7), (8).
"In the United States the debtor is protected under 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (prohibition for
imprisonment for a debt) and in Mississippi under the MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. III
§ 30 for inability to pay a civil debt. Compare P. ROCK, MAKING PEOPLE PAY 221
(1973). (In support of the system of debtor prisons in England).
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was intended.5 8 The plaintiff's burden of proof is required to go
beyond the establishment of illegal misuse of process. He must also
prove that an ulterior motive was involved.,"
To sustain a cause of action for malicious prosecution, it is
necessary to establish malice and want of probable cause."0 Like
abuse of process, malicious prosecution has been applied by creditors
and collectors, with the aid of "cooperative law enforcement
officials," for the purpose of extorting the debtor to hurry and pay.
Under either cause of action an aggrieved debtor will often find
himself unable to effectively pursue his rights. Such lawsuits are cost-
ly and time consuming. The average consumer is usually unable to
afford the fees for filing costs and depositions. It is also apparent that
the job of discovery is complicated since law enforcement officials
make impressive witnesses and they are usually reluctant to testify.
The abusive collector, although not immune from civil prosecution, is
insulated with the confidence that he will probably never be forced to
answer for his actions in court."'
Failure on the part of the states to provide adequate protective
legislation and the common law's inability to quash unfair debt col-
lection practices, substantiate the real need for comprehensive federal
legislation. Congress recognized this need when it decided to ap-
proach the problems consumers faced due to unfair collection prac-
tices.
BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Cum.
Supp. 1978), an amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA), was introduced for the second time in the House of Represen-
tatives as H.R. 5294.62 Although the resolution did not encounter
"See Hyde Constr. Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Miss. 1974);
Magnum v. Jones, 236 So. 2d 741 (Miss. 1970); and Little v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697 (1953).
"I1d. See also Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d
171 (1957):
Typical of the cases where the action will lie is where through the employment
o process a man has been arrested or his property seized in order to extort pay-
ment of money from him even though the claim be a just one other than in that
suit, or to prevent a conveyance, or to compel him to give up possession of
something of value, when such were not the legal objects of the suit.
Id. at 594, 175.
"See Hyde Constr. Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Miss. 1974);
Chain v. Int'l. City Bank and Trust Co., 333 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. La. 1971); and Ed-
monds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171 (1957).
"Jordan & Warren, supra note 15, at 457.
6 2H.R. 5294, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. H2919 (daily ed. April 4, 1977). The
Resolution was originally introduced and passed during the 94th Congress, 1976 ses-
sion, but did not have enough time to be acted upon by the Senate. H. R. 13720, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H7787-98 (1976).
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strenuous opposition in the hearing, 3 opponents raised heated debate
immediately before the vote. " There were two objections: 1) unwar-
ranted intrusion of the federal government into an area intended for
state jurisdiction and regulation, 6 and 2) the proposed criminal sanc-
tion imposed on debt collectors who willfully violated the provisions
of the Act. 8 Opposition was mounted so quickly, H.R. 5294 passed
by only one vote."'
By the time the resolution was introduced on the Senate floor for
debate and voting, effective compromises had been worked out. The
criminal provision was dropped due to testimony during Senate Hear-
ings that described the criminal sanction as unnecessary and probably
unenforceable.68 Proponents also had explained convincingly enough
that the possibility of state regulation would still exist because of sec-
tions 1692n and 16920.89 Under section 1692o a state may be exempt-
ed if it enacts substantially similar laws. Furthermore, under section
1692n only inconsistent state laws are annulled by the FDCPA, with
state laws affording greater protection left in force. Thus, state
regulation would not be foreclosed by the FDCPA. Finally, the fact
that many states had failed to enact any debt collection laws and only
eight states had strong debt collection statutes pointed to the urgency
of federal regulation and uniformity."
"Proposed Amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hearings on H.R.
5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Cur-
rency, and Housing, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 1-773 (1977). Cf., Supplemental Views on
H.R. 5294.
6'123 CONG. REC. H2924-34. (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977).
6SId. at H2928-33 (remarks of Rep.'s Ashbrook, Sawyer, Bauman and Rousselot).
8 1d. at H2933-34 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
71d. at H2934-35.
"Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 51 (statement of Rep. Chalmers Wylie); 181
(statement of Rep. Charles Wiggins); 442 (A National Survey of the Complaint-
Handling Procedures Used By Consumers 1976); 666-67 (statement from the Depart-
ment of Justice).
09§ 1692 n. Relation to State laws.
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to
the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State
with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent
of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent
with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater
than the protection provided by this subchapter.
§ 1692o. Exemption for State Regulation.
The commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this sub-
chapter any class of debt collection practices within any State if the commission
determines that under the law of that State, that class of debt collection practice
is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this sub-
chapter, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.
"See note 17, supra.
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The "federal intrusion" objection stemmed partly from prior ex-
perience with CCPA legislation.7 Because the FDCPA was patterned
after prior CCPA legislation,72 in particular the liability section, a
noteworthy compromise was made to appease the opponents: the one
hundred dollar minimum recovery found under the Truth-in-Lending
Act 3 was eliminated in an attempt to avoid further nuisance suits and
court congestion. A provision was also entered to award the defend-
ant attorney's fees when it could be shown the suit was brought in bad
faith.74
Further departure from prior CCPA legislation is found in section
16921(d) of the FDCPA.7 s Under this provision the confusion of inter-
preting additional commission or other federal agency procedures
and regulations will not haunt businessmen and their counsel the way
Regulation Z and the Four Installment Rule" have. Thus,
the law is within the four corners of this bill . . ., the Federal Trade
Commission has to come back to this Congress to find out what they
are supposed to do in the case of a practice which they find, or think
should be declared to be, an unethical or unlawful practice: In other
words, Congress is the final authority.7
Although the American Bar Association continued its opposition,
urging that regulation of collection agencies be left to the individual
states, s the resolution passed the Senate supported by a wide range of
the American public, including the two major trade associations.70
On its return to the House, the Resolution passed with little debate by
voice vote."0 The compromises effectively snuffed out previous op-
position.
" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 5 (state-
ment of Sen. Garn).
"See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 51 (statement of Chalmers Wylie, ranking
minority member).
13"'[Tlhe liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater
than $1,000." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1970).
"15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(3).
" S5 U.S.C. 16921(d). "'Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in
subsection (b) of this section may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations
with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this subchapter."
Id.
"See Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). See also
15 U.S.L. § 1604; 12 C.F.R. 226.8 (1978).
"1123 CONG. REC. H2924 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Wylie).
"See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 763-65. (A.B.A. Report to the House of
Delegates Standing Committee on National Conference Groups).
"See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. The "bill was strongly supported by con-
sumer groups, labor unions, State and Federal law enforcement officials, and by both
national organizations which represent the debt collection profession, the American
Collectors Association and Associated Credit Bureaus." Id.
"123 CONG. REC. H8993-97 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977).
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MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT
In a nutshell, the purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers
from the unethical debt collector."' Under the FDCPA, the debt col-
lector is defined to include only those third parties who regularly col-
lect consumer debts for others."s
The FDCPA provides the consumer-debtor with several major pro-
tective measures:
Acquisition of location information. When contacting third per-
sons to establish a consumer-debtor's whereabouts, a debt collector
must not reveal that the consumer owes a debt in any form or manner.
The debt collector is further restricted if he knows that the consumer-
debtor is represented by an attorney. If the collector has the
attorney's name and address, he is forbidden from contacting third
parties whatsoever in an attempt to acquire further location informa-
tion.8 3
Communication in connection with debt collection. Unless the
consumer gives prior consent, a debt collector may not contact the
consumer at any inconvenient time or place; the collector may not
contact the consumer if the consumer is represented by an attorney
and may not call the consumer at work if the collector knows that the
consumer's employer prohibits such calls.14 There is also a general
prohibition on the collector making third party contacts."5 To protect
himself from continued annoyance, the consumer may give the collec-
tor written notice that he refuses to pay the debt and simultaneously
order the collector to cease contacting him. The collector is then for-
bidden from making further contacts, except to notify the consumer
of possible further actions. 8 The collector is further forbidden from
committing acts with the intent to harass, abuse, or cause apprehen-
sion of violence.8 This is of particular importance due to the Con-
gressional concern over the reputation debt collectors have acquired
in the past for abusive practices.8 8
In addition to the prohibitions already stated, the debt collector is
also prohibited from making false or misleading representations when
"See 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
"Id. § 1692a(6). But see Comment, Debt Collection Practices: The Need for Com-
prehensive Legislation, 15 DUQUESNE L. REV. 97,120 (1976). The law "has been
criticized for concentrating its restrictions on the practices of professional debt collec-
tors." Id. at 120.
"
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
"Id. § 1692c(a).
"Id. § 1692b.
"Id. § 1692c.
"Id. § 1692d.
"Id. § 1692.
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attempting to collect debts;"9 using unfair practices, such as charging
excess interest on debt or revealing to third parties the consumer's
debt;90 furnishing deceptive forms with the intention of creating a
belief in the mind of the debtor a third person other than the debt col-
lector is collecting the debt;"' and applying payments to disputed
debts. 2
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT
Enforcement of the FDCPA is provided by three avenues. First,
an individual may bring an action under section 1692k. Second, sec-
tion 1692k also provides for a class action when proper. Finally, ad-
ministrative enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission is in-
cluded under section 16921. The authors will concentrate on section
1692k since the primary means of enforcement of the Act like 15
U.S.C. section 1640 (1968) of the Truth-in-Lending Act, is by in-
dividuals.13
The civil liability section of this Act apparently used the Truth-in-
Lending Act civil liability section as a model. The changes made in
section 1692k of the Act were made with Congressional intent to re-
tain the substance of 15 U.S.C. section 1640 (1968) of the Truth-in-
Lending Act, yet improve the negative aspects some critics felt section
1640 contained.9 4 Thus a study of pertinent case law will aid in a
greater understanding of the civil liability provisions of the FDCPA.
Probably the most famous section 1640 case is the early decision
of Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company."s In this case
the federal district court described the intent of the statute: "The
scheme of the statute, as both sides agree, is to create a species of
Iprivate attorney general' to participate prominently in enforce-
ment.""9 This concept has been followed uniformly, including the
more recent Fifth Circuit case of McGowan v. Credit Center of North
Jackson, Inc."7
"Id. § 1692e. Impersonating a government official or attorney, misrepresenting the
amount or nature of a debt, misrepresenting a consumer's legal rights, deliberately us-
ing false credit information, etc. are prohibited.
00Id. § 1692f.
"Id. § 1692j.
'
2 Id. § 1692h. When applicable, the debt collector must also apply payments in ac-
cordance with the consumer-debtor's directions.
"See note 77, at 52, supra. See also, Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 756
(2nd Cir. 1975).
"See notes 71-75, 77, supra.
"329 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
"Id. at 280.
'""The Congressional goals underlying the Truth-in-Lending Act include the crea-
tion of a system of private attorneys general to aid in the effective enforcement of the
Act." 546 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1976). See e.g., White v. Arlen Realty and Develop-
ment Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1975); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 121 (5th
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To help promote this "private attorney general" concept and
allow consumer victims more participation in policing the Act, courts
have uniformly held that the language of the Title Act "should be con-
strued liberally in light of its broadly remedial purpose.''9 s There is
authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court has implicitly
affirmed this view."' Both the "private attorney general" concept and
"liberal construction" view should apply to the FDCPA, since the
FDCPA's main purpose is to further consumer protection by self-
enforcement.' 0
The second means of enforcement under the FDCPA is the class
action provision.' 0' Under the comparable Truth-in-Lending Act sec-
tion, pre-1974 courts struggled to answer the questions of whether the
Truth-in-Lending Act meant to provide for class actions and whether
class actions should be dismissed because of the possibility of a "hor-
rendous result."'' 0 However, section 1640 was amended to limit the
recovery under a class action. This amendment effectively disposed
of the "horrendous result" rule.1
0 3
Cir. 1974); Daugherty v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of South Bend, 435 F. Supp.
218 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
"Murphy v. Household Finance Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1977); Hannon
v. Security National Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Meyers-
Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973); French v. Wilson, 444 F.
Supp. 216, 220 (D. R.I. 1978); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F.
Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 756
(2nd Cir. 1975).
"White v. Arlen Realty and Development Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that Mourning v. Family Publications, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) implicitly af-
firmed the "liberal construction" rule of Ratner.)
"O'See, SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5; see also notes 71-75, 77, supra.
"115 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(2)(B).
In the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could
be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may
allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual
recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or one per centum of the net
worth of the debt collector....
Id.
102See e.g., Mathews v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Cal.
1974); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
For more background on the pre-19 7 4 Truth-in-Lending class action controversy see
Note, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410-38 (1973).
10315 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(B) (1970).
In the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow, except that as
to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and the
total recovery in such case shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or I
per centum of the net worth of the creditor. ...
Id.
Courts have uniformly held that the "horrendous result" concept was removed by
the amendment. E.g., Boggs v. Auto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir.
1975). See Paer, Truth in Lending: Protection for the Consumer orfor the Creditor, 53
N. C. L. REV. 1286-88 (1975); Comment, The 1974 Amendments to the Truth in
Lending Act, 24 EMORY L.J. 371-72 (1975).
19791
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc."' contains an analysis of the pro-
cedure a federal court should use in determining whether a class ac-
tion should be maintained. First, the court must exercise its deter-
mination "within the parameters of Rule 23 as applied to the apper-
taining facts once these facts are adduced to the point that a deter-
mination may be made."' 05 Then the determination of the trial court
will stand absent an abuse of discretion.10 6 Second, Rule 23 will be
applied to Truth-in-Lending Act cases just as it is applied generally.
This includes 1) establishing Rule 23(a) prerequisites'07 and 2) pro-
ceeding under Rule 23(b) once 23(a) prerequisites are met. 08 Since
the Boggs decision is a post Truth-in-Lending Act Amendment case,
the court's rationale concerning CCPA class actions should apply to
the FDCPA also.
If the requirement of maintaining a class action suit under the
FDCPA seems formidable, consider the additional rule in the decision
of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.'" In that case the Supreme Court of
the United States held that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)
(1974) provides that in any class action suit under Rule 23(b)(3), the
plaintiff must pay the costs of notice to all members who can be
reasonably identified. Also, "[ilndividual notice to identifiable class
members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a par-
ticular case.""10 Because of the difficulties of maintaining a class ac-
tion suit under the CCPA, it appears the most favored remedial device
will continue to be an individual action. Therefore, the fact that class
actions may recover greater punitive damages does not necessarily
make them more appealing.
104511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975).
'Id. at 117.
"Id.
1"1FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all parties is im-
practicable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequate-
ly protect the interests of the class.
Id.
s"Usually, subsection (b)(3) is the avenue taken by plaintiffs seeking to maintain a
class action within the Truth-in-Lending Act." Boggs, 511 F.2d at 117; FED. R. CIV. P.
23 (b)(3) says,
(b) Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisified, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and ef-
ficient adjudication of the controversy....
"'417 U.S. 156 (1974).
S"'Id. at 176.
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A substantial majority of courts in the United States recognize the
general rule that a claim for exemplary damages alone is an insuffi-
cient basis for a cause of action, and that in order to justify the
recovery of punitive damages, there must be a showing of actual in-
jury which would justify an award of actual or compensatory
damages."' But under Truth-in-Lending Act case law, where a viola-
tion of the Truth-in-Lending Act occurred, the clear majority of
courts have given the minimum $100 recovery and thus opened the
door to punitive damages, regardless of the technicality of the viola-
tions."' The rationale is to further the purpose of self enforcement
and the "private attorney general" concept. However, under the
FDCPA, the minimum recovery was dropped and courts will use the
criteria under section 1692k(b)"3 to determine damages."1 Should
the courts continue to award actual and punitive damages for tech-
nical violations under the FDCPA, section 1692k(b) will hopefully
lead a fair-minded court to allow damages commensurate with the
violations.
The question will arise as to whether a suit brought for a strictly
technical violation would be considered "harassment and in bad
...17 A.L.R.2d 527.
"'E.g., Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[Oince the court
finds a violation no matter how technical, it has no discretion with respect to the im-
position of liability.") Id. at 510; Pennino v. Morris Kirchbaum & Co., Inc., 526 F.2d
367 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to use the term "new balance"); Houston v. Atlanta Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n., 414 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (court held language as con-
fusing and misleading where customer's statement provided for late penalty if monthly
installments not paid when due, but express terms of mortgage gave 15 days after due
date for late charges).
1115 U.S.C. 1692k(b).
(b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subdivision (a) of
this section, the court shall consider among other relevant factors-
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(4) of this section, the fre-
quency and persistency of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of
such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was inten-
tional; or
(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section, the frequency
and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such non-
compliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely
affected, and the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was inten-
tional.
"'Another disturbing question is whether a plaintiff that can show no actual or
punitive damages has standing to sue. Previous Truth-in-Lending decisions were split
on the issue. See 53 N. CAR. L. REV. Note 125, at 1285. Critics say this helped create a
logjam of cases in the federal district courts. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at
5.
However, there appears to be no Congressional intent to the effect that eliminating
the $100 minimum recovery was meant to rob a plaintiff of standing where he has no
actual or punitive damages but merely a technical violation to complain about. It ap-
pears that Congress eliminated the $100 minimum recovery merely to allow more
discretion in the amount of damages, if any.
19791
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
faith" under section 1692k(a)(3). This argument should be invalid
since Congress meant to set out objective standards to determine
violations and the importance of the "private attorney general" con-
cept should not be overlooked.
jurisdiction for the FDCPA is conferred under section i692k(d)."5
The question of what is meant by "any other court of competent
jurisdiction" has been answered under the comparable Truth-in-
Lending Act section jurisdiction."'  In Lewis v. Delta Loans, Inc."7
the Mississippi Supreme Court held there is nothing inherently wrong
with the idea that state and federal courts can exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over federally created rights."' Unless these federally
created rights are expressly restricted to federal courts, state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction." ' Finally, in the absence of congres-
sional intent, the court held that state courts (which include county
courts) have concurrent jurisdiction under the Truth-in-Lending Act
provision.'20 Although common law remedies carry a greater burden
of proof, they may be included under the cause of action if necessary.
Furthermore, because of their independent jurisdictional base under
section 1692(k)(d), federal district courts should address the propriety
of exercising pendent jurisdiction over the state claim.' 2'
The Truth-in-Lending Act civil liability section that has spawned
the most litigation in recent years is, quite naturally, the provision for
attorney's fees.' 22 Courts have begun to award attorney's fees under
the Truth-in-Lending Act unrestrained by the small amount of
damages.'23
In McGowan, in response to a district court's reduction of fees
because the attorney had been successful "in only one minor charge,"
"1515 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). "An action to enforce any liability created by this sub-
chapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard
to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within
one year from the date on which the violation occurs." Id.
"15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970). This section differs from 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) only in
the fact that the words "'without regard to the amount in controversy" are omitted from
section 1640(e), but obviously implicit because of the effect of section 1640(e).
"'300 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 1975).
"'Id. at 144.
""Id.
'2OId"
"'See FED. R. CIv. P. 18; Murray v. Amoco Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976)
held that under the Truth-in-Lending Act, the district court must address the question of
pendent jurisdiction because of the independent jurisdictional base of the Truth-in-
Lending claim. See generally, C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS, 72-77 (3rd ed.
1976).
"'15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).
...See Pedro v. Pacific Plan of California, 393 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (The
court awarded $750 damages with $3,000 attorney's fees); Grubb v. Oliver Enterprise,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (The court awarded $200 damages with $1,750
attorney's fees).
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the Fifth Circuit said such a reduction "would be inconsistent with
the congressional policy of implementing enforcement of the Truth-
in-Lending Act."' 24 Furthermore, on remand the district court was to
determine a reasonable attorney's fee in accordance with general
principles of assessment. '2  The Federal Courts have also held that
additional attorney's fees may be obtained for a successful appeal.'2 6
The FDCPA interestingly dropped the minimum $100 penalty
found under the Truth-in-Lending Act. This presents a question:
should attorney's fees be allowed where the court considers the viola-
tion to be so technical as to not merit any damages? This answer may
lie in the answer to the following: Do the words "foregoing liability"
in section 1692k(a)(3) mean there must be some liability under section
1692k(a)(1) or (2)? Probably so, but even if not, reasonable men
would assume that where there are no actual damages and a court
allowed no punitive damages using section 1692k(b) as a guide an at-
torney should not receive fees. What grave injustice has he proven?
The better view would be to allow attorney's fees only where there are
at least nominal damages awarded. Under this viewpoint the con-
gressional intent to avoid further nuisance suits may be furthered. 2 7
The other Truth-in-Lending Act suits concerning attorney's fees
that will help clarify the FDCPA are Sellers v. Wollman18 and Han-
non v. Security National Bank.129 In the Sellers case, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the question of whether attorney's fees could be given to a
member of a Legal Aid Society representing the plaintiff. The Fifth
Circuit held that an award for attorney's fees "is not contingent upon
"'546 F.2d at 77.
"'In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) the
Fifth Circuit set out the following guidelines to be used as general principles that govern
the assessment of attorney's fees:
1) The time and labor required.
2) The novelty and difficulty of the question.
3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case.
5) The customary fee.
6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
7) Time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances.
8) Amount involved and results obtained.
9) Experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney.
10) The "undesirability" of the case.
11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
12) Awards in similar cases.
Id. at 717-19.
"'Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973); Sosa v.
Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (Sth Cir. 1974).
"'See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 5 (state-
ment of Sen. Garn); 51 (statement of Chalmers Wylie, ranking minority member).
8'510 F.2d 119 (Sth Cir. 1975).
"'537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976).
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an obligation to pay an attorney or the fact that no fee was
charged."'' 30 In Hannon the Ninth Circuit held that a law school
graduate that represented himself under a Truth-in-Lending Action
was not entitled to recover attorney's fees.' 31
Under the FDCPA there appear to be five key defenses available to
the defendant debt collector. First, various definitional defenses will
be available. Foremost among them is section 1692a(b), which
defines what "debt collector" means under the Act and excludes
(among others) attorneys, in-house collectors for creditors, process
servers, government officials collecting in their official capacities,
and bonafide consumer credit counseling services, Included under
this defense will be the determination of class for a class action suit.132
The second key area of defenses available to the defendant would be
lack of jurisdiction or a bar of filing an action because of the statute of
limitations.'33 Although Lewis held state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction under the Truth-in-Lending Act, there is no authority con-
cerning concurrent jurisdiction under the Truth-in-Lending Act with
courts of more limited jurisdiction. The third key defense is known as
the "unintentional error" defense."' The courts have consistently
held since 1974 that the "unintentional error" defense was meant for
"clerical" mistakes only. 3 The fourth key defense is the "good
"'*510 F.2d at 123; Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., Inc., 533 F.2d
102, 106 (3rd Cir. 1976); Campbell v. Liberty Financial Planning, Inc., 422 F. Supp.
1386, 1389 (D. Neb. 1976); Gillard v. Aetna Finance Co., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 737, 749
(E.D. La. 1976). It should be remembered, however, that in many Legal Aid Society
charters or rules, their attorneys are not allowed to handle "fee generating" cases. The
reasoning is that the private bar can handle them satisfactorily. Certainly one would
consider FDCPA and Truth-in-Lending actions as "fee generating." See R. CLONTZ, JR.,
I TRUTH IN LENDING MANUAL 3-181, (2d ed. 1976).
""'Had Congress wished to compensate non-attorneys for 'services' rendered on
their own behalf in pressing their individual claims, it certainly would have done so."
537 F.2d at 329.
"'See notes 104-108, supra.
"'See notes 115-121, supra.
'15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this sub-
chapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the
violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstand-
ing the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
Id.
I3SFor comparison, the following cases hold that only a creditor's "clerical"
mistakes apply: Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 757 (2nd Cir. 1975); Matter of
Dickson, 432 F. Supp. 752, 760 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Gillard v. Aetna Finance Co., Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 737, 748 (E.D. La. 1976); Powers v. Sims and Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp.
12, 20 (E.D. Va. 1975); Starks v. New Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. La.
1974); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). For contrary results holding that section 1640(c) also applies to good faith at-
tempts to comply with the Act, see, Hamilton v. C. A. C. Finance Corp., 4 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 98,803 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones, 259
So. 2d 587 (La. App. 1971), affd 274 So. 2d 150, cert. denied 414 U.S. 820 (1937).
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faith" reliance on a FTC advisory opinion. The similar Truth-in-
Iending provision, section 1640(c), generated a conflict in authorities
in the early 1970's as to whether the provision allowed a good faith
reliance on advisory opinions of the Federal Reserve Board. 36 Thus,
Congress amended section 1640 in 1974 to include 15 U.S.C. section
1640(f), which allows as a "good faith" defense, reliance on an ad-
visory opinion of the FTC. This defense is also available under sec-
tion 1692k(e) as long as the advisory opinion has not been "amended,
rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid
for any reason."' 37 The fifth and final key defense is the "limitation of
damages" aspect. Section 1692k(b) sets out criteria used in determin-
ing the amount of liability under an individual or class action. 3 8
CONCLUSION
For the last ten years consumers have made considerable gains in
the form of protective federal legislation. In 1968 the Congress
passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA). The CCPA itself
is broken into subchapters, 3 with the FDCPA being its newest sub-
chapter. In order to protect consumers from the extortionate prac-
tices of "loan sharks" and organized crime,'"0 the Extortionate Credit
Transactions Act' 4 ' was passed by Congress in 1968 to provide cer-
tain criminal sanctions for extortionate collection practices.'
4 2
Other pieces of federal consumer protection legislation had also
been enacted prior to the FDCPA. For instance, under Title 15 U.S.C.
§ § 41-58 (1970) the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered
by Congress to institute proceedings to prevent deceptive practices in
the collection of debts and the gathering of information about
'"Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp. of Fulton County, 544 F.2d 1228, 1232,
rehearing denied 545 F.2d 1298, (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 97 S. Ct. 2642 (1977);
Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 758 (1st Cir. 1975); Powers v. Sims and Levin
Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12, 20 (E.D. Va. 1975).
"'15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e).
"'See notes 111-114, supra.
'1I. Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure [Truth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1665) (1970)1.
II. Restriction on Garnishment (15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1970)).
III. Credit Reporting Agencies [Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681)
(1970)].
IV. National Commission on Consumer Finance Equal Credit Opportunity (15
U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692f (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
V. Debt Collection Practices [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692)
(Cum. Supp. 1978) ].
"'See Extortionate Credit Transactions, Pub. L. 90-321, § 202(a), 82 Stat. 159
(1970). See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Calegro
De Lutro, 309 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"'18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970).
"'See e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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debtors." 3 Another statute, Title 18 U.S.C. sections 709-712 (1970),
makes it a crime to falsely advertise and to misuse names so as to in-
dicate a federal agency.'
4
4
It is also important to note that FTC activity in the area of debt
collection dates back over thirty years.1 4s The FTC has the authority
to require collection services to cease and desist from using materials,
from making representations which do not clearly reveal the true pur-
pose for which the information is being requested, ' and from mak-
ing any form of representations with the intent to deceive.141 In the
process of administrative enforcement the courts have repeatedly con-
firmed the Commission's "wide discretion in determining the type of
order that is necessary to cope with the unfair practices found. ... 41
Even before the codification of section 1692, the FTC had been active
in third party debt collection practice cases.'"
The fact that the FTC has been involved in third party debt collec-
tion practice cases for so long has prompted some groups to question
I'"See e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 237.1, n. (1978). The FTC expressly prohibits agencies from
making the following misrepresentations:
(1) That the information is being sought in connection with a survey.
(2) That the agency is a casting agency for the motion picture or television industry.
(3) That an industry member has a prepaid package for the debtor.
(4) That a sum of money or valuable gift will be sent to the addressee if the required
information is furnished.
(5) That the debtor's accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for
value.
(6) That debts have been turned over to an attorney or an independent organization
engaged in the business of collecting past-due accounts.
(7) That documents are legal forms.
Id.
See also 16 C.F.R. § 237.2 (1978) under which the FTC requires that any com-
munication which has as its purpose the collection of a debt or the obtaining of informa-
tion regarding a debtor disclose this purpose.
'See S. REP, No. 107, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 874, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1959). Section 712 prohibits:
the use by collecting agencies or private detective agencies of any emblem, in-
signia, or name, or the words "national," "Federal," or "United States," or the
initials "U.S." for the purpose of conveying and in a manner reasonably
calculated to convey the false impression that such business is a department,
agency, bureau, or instrumentality of the United States.
See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-1 (1972).
'E.g., Bureau of Engraving, Inc. and Art Instructions, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 192 (1944).
"1015 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
"'See note 143, supra. See also Providence Washington Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 345
(1977); Atlantic Industries, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 903 (1975); United States v. Boneparth, 456
F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1972); William H. Wise Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 246 F.2d
702 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States Stationary Co., 49 F.T.C. 745 (1953); and Bureau of
Engraving, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 192 (1944).
"4'Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965).
'See notes 143 & 146, supra. See also Higgins, ABA National Institute Proceedings
on Consumer Credit: June 16-17, 1977, 33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1013, 1015 (Feb.
1978).
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the need for increased federal legislation. Some observers feel that
"[t]he Commission's case-by-case approach has made quite clear what
is expected of creditors, and there is little or no need to codify these
cases in the form of a trade regulation rule.' s Other observers state
that section 1692 is an "unwarranted [flederal intrusion into an area
best left to the states,"'"' that the "Federal Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act will be one more regulatory burden on small businesses, the
cost of which will be borne by the consumer." ''"2
At first glance, the unsuspecting mind might be tempted to
acknowledge the warnings of the opponents of the FDCPA. It is
logical to assume, for instance, that there have been too many
frivolous nuisance suits, as exemplified under the Truth-in-Lending
Act, 3 and that there will be increased federal intervention in an area
of law that had previously been determined by state and common law
remedies. But once the thoughtful mind is able to penetrate the haze
of "state's rights," etc., the root of all the warnings appears-money.
To the third party debt collector, time is money, and money is time.
The faster a collector can get a delinquent debtor to pay his bill, the
quicker he can press on to new fields to conquer. It is interesting to
note, however, that the FDCPA is supported by a wide range of the
American public, including the collection industry itself."'
Some opponents of the FDCPA may claim that the CCPA, prior to
the addition of section 1692, provides the debtor with adequate pro-
tection from debt collection abuses. This too is erroneous. The thrust
of the Truth-in-Lending Act' 5 "is to require full disclosure of credit
costs so that consumers will be able to shop for credit."''5 Sections
1671 to 1677 on restrictions on garnishments are the legislative at-
tempt to "remove the hardships stemming from the use of that
remedy." ' s The Fair Credit Reporting Act 1s8 has a two-fold purpose.
It is designated to regulate the consumer reporting industry and to
"'Higgins, ABA National Institute Proceedings on Consumer Credit: June 16-17,
1977, 33 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1013, 1016 (Feb. 1978).
"'SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (additional views of Messrs. Schmitt, Garn,
and Tower). See also 123 CONG. REG. H2928-33 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977) (remarks of
Reps. Ashbrook, Sawyer, Bauman, and Rousselot).
"'SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 3,4
(statement of Sen. Schmitt); 4-7 (statement of Sen. Garn).
'See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 5 (state-
ment of Sen. Garn).
"'See note 79, supra.
"'15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970).
'soId.
"'See Caplovitz, supra note 5, at 653. See also Moo, Legislative Control of Con-
sumer Credit Transactions, 33 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 656 (1968).
"Basically the CCPA is only a disclosure law. It does not regulate or control ...
debtor's remedies, or any of the substantive features of a consumer credit transaction."
Id. at 662.
's'15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
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place disclosure obligations on users of collection reports."'9 It is a
necessary link in the chain of consumer credit protection; but, like the
other three subchapters of the CCPA, it gives no relief for the
consumer-debtor who is plagued by the abusive third party debt col-
lector.
It is inevitable that the FDCPA will continue to undergo some
valid criticisms and some that are not so valid. For instance, the
argument that the FDCPA will intrude on the rights of states to
manage their own affairs is both an old and very weak one. Every
time Congress seeks to enlarge the protective scope of the federal
jurisdiction in the area of civil and human rights, there are always
those who balk in the name of states' rights. The argument by legis-
lators may derive from their indifference towards those who cannot
protect themselves and/or their inability to grasp the historical
significance of what they are saying. History has revealed on many
occasions that as a civilization becomes more industrialized and ur-
banized in its evolution to modernity, the need for centralized and
ordered government becomes more critical. Therefore, whether or
not we like the idea of increasing federal encroachments, we must
often adjust if our belief in a just and ordered system is to survive.
The argument in favor of the case-by-case approach is weak in its
substantive origins. For instance, the ability of the common law to
provide adequate legal protection before the abusive collector has had
an opportunity to do his damage is practically non-existent. As
previously discussed,8 0 the common law is not designed for preven-
tion, only compensation. By having specific legislation, accompanied
by supportive regulations, the debtor and the collector are both pro-
tected. The debtor no longer is subjected to unnecessary harassment
and the collector is encouraged to remember that an ounce of preven-
tion will keep him from having to defend himself in court for collect-
ing a just debt.
The fact that there has been some prior federal legislation' 6 in the
area of debt collections is by no means absolute in its effectiveness as a
means of protection from debt collection abuses. Here the statutory
failure is derived not only from a lack of substantive grit, but also
from the presence of a loosely aligned confederation of statutes and a
hodgepodge of complimentary regulations.' 2  The FTC has
historically engaged in policing collection agency practices and under
section 1692 will continue to do so.'" The difference is that laws
governing debt collection practices may now be interpreted under one
unambiguous source of federal legislation.
"'See Caplovitz, supra note 5, at 653.
"'See pp., 161-66 supra.
"'See pp., 166-68 supra.
"'See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58; 18 U.S.C. §§ 709-712; and 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896(1970).
"'See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 20, 21 (testimony of Rep. Annunzio).
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If the FDCPA has any serious shortcomings it is only that the
wording of the Act excludes attorneys and in-house-collectors from
the statutory definition of debt collector.164 The debtor's remedies
and protections under law remain stagnant when the debtor is pur-
sued by one of the aforementioned parties. One may even speculate
that the FDCPA will create an increase in attorney collections.
The shortcomings, however, are far outweighed by the potential
benefits which the consumer community stands to gain. At the same
time, it is likely to perceive that the FDCPA will one day become the
standard to which all collectors will adhere. It is not conjecture to
say that, although in-house-collectors are immune from civil liability
under the Act's sanctions, they will be more and more aware of the
consumer-debtor's rights and will hopefully follow the FDCPA as
their ethical guideline. The debt collecting industry will certainly at-
tain a new sense of consciousness as to the rights of the individual
because of the passage of the FDCPA.
David C. Frazier and Edward Tonore
'"See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A),(F).
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